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1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress
Re-Asserts Its Warmaking Power
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever
he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow
him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it neces-
sary. . . This our convention understood to be the most oppres-
sive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the
Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing
oppression upon us.'
Abraham Lincoln
Despite this warning by Abraham Lincoln and his interpretation of
the Constitution, the President has assumed a preeminent position in
the commitment of United States troops abroad. The purpose of this
article is to examine the nature and context of recent military actions,
to examine the current legislation restraining Presidential power to
commit troops, and to discuss the strategic, political and constitutional
implications of this legislation.
American history is replete with examples of executive deployment
without the consent of Congress, such as the action in Korea in 1950
taken by President Truman.2 Since the end of World War II, Congress
has exercised a dominant influence in only one decision to intervene
with armed force. This sole instance of participation came in 1954
when apprehensions and doubts in Congress led President Eisenhower
to abandon a plan for involvement in Indochina.' Since 1954, deci-
sion-making in the area of armed intervention has been characterized
by Presidential dominance and Congressional reluctance to assert its
powers. 4
1. 2 WRITNGs OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 52 (Lapsitz ed. 1905).
2. For a complete summary of Presidential use of armed force see Emerson,
War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L REv. 53, 88 (1971).
3. See J. ROBINSON, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN PoLICbMAkG 54 (1962), for an
analysis of the degree of Congressional participation in foreign and defense policy
decisions.
4. For a summary of the steady growth of Presidential power, see SENATE COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON NATIONAL CoMmrrMENTS TO
ACCOMPANY S. RES. 85 (1969).
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In May of 1954, a small CIA-organized and -equipped force invaded
Guatemala which was then ruled by a left wing junta.5 On July 14-
15, 1958, President Eisenhower landed 14,000 Marines in Lebanon
to restore order and protect the government reportedly under seige by
Syrian Communists. 6 President Kennedy planned the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion of Cuba in April, 1961, and later that year positioned eight
ships carrying 1800 Marines just outside Santo Domingo Harbor in
support of the revolt led by General Echacarria. 7  Troops were again
sent to the Dominican Republic in 1965 when civil war erupted.
American involvement in Indochina has occasioned continuous rein-
forcement and expansion of United States troop commitments. In
1962, President Kennedy began sending increased military assistance
and substantial numbers of military advisors to Vietnam. Troop
buildup continued under President Johnson and by 1968 the level had
exceeded 450,000. Under President Nixon, American ground troops
invaded Cambodia in 1970 and in 1971 the Air Force began strike
operations in Laos.8 It is also contended that ground troops have con-
ducted combat operations in Thailand and Laos.9
The present situation has resulted more from Congressional abdica-
tion of its responsibility than Presidential usurpation of power. Con-
gress has been content to take a back seat in defense policy decisions.
It has created its own agencies independent of the executive and iso-
lated from the channels of information upon which defense and na-
tional security decisions are based."° In addition to isolating itself
from information, Congress has isolated itself from the decision-making
process by sweeping delegations of authority to the President. This
unwillingness to take an active role is largely the result of three factors.
5. See R. SCHNEIDER, COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA 311 (1959), for a general dis-
cussion of the success of the American involvement in Guatemala.
6. The claim of Communist infiltration has been hotly disputed. Senator Ful-
bright has questioned whether there was any Communist involvement, and the Eisen-
hower administration produced no evidence that there was. See R. BARNET, INTER-
VENTION AND REVOLUTION 132 (1968).
7. For an interesting account of the decision-making by the Kennedy administra-
tion that led up to the Bay of Pigs and Dominican Republic invasions, see A.
SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND DAYS 132, 276 (1965).
8. While all the actions described since 1954 took place without the prior con-
sent of Congress, only Presidents Johnson and Nixon claimed to possess such power in
the absence of an emergency.. See. Schlesinger, See If You Can Fix Any Limit To
His Power, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973 (Magazine) at 12.
9. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
10. See T. Lowi, Hearings on the Congress, the President, and the War Powers
before the Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Developments of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1970) [hereinafter
referred to as 1970 War Powers Hearings]. Congress has also allowed the President
to make more and more important commitments via the executive agreement. See
Matthews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agree-
ments, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955).
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First, members of Congress have felt they should defer to Presiden-
tial expertise in foreign relations. Not only do Congressional leaders
feel the Executive has superior information, but they also think he
is in a better position to take decisive action in the context of the
cold war. This also explains the development of a bipartisan foreign
policy, with Congressional leaders of both parties supporting Presiden-
tial initiatives."
A second reason for Presidential ascendancy is the consensus that
developed concerning United States responsibility abroad. Although
the 1970's have evidenced a breakdown of this consensus, it existed
for most of the period since World War H and removed any political
incentive from opposing Presidential leadership.1"
Thirdly, the President's facility for speedy reaction has placed him
in the forefront of what can be considered an era of crisis. The last
decade has been characterized by emergencies which have left the
Congress in a position only to "reflect, review, advise, grant or with-
hold consent."' 13
The situation was recently summarized by Senator Muskie: "It suf-
fices here to say that, as matters now stand, the Congress exercises
no more than a marginal influence on decisions as to whether the na-
tion will be committed to war."' 4
CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WARMAKING
The Appropriations Process
The Constitution clearly places the authority for appropriating
money in the Congress.' 5 Critics of recent proposals for controlling
Presidential warmaking argue that the appropriations power insures
Congressional participation. Although the power is specifically
granted, the realities of military intervention have denied a Congres-
sional role. Troop deployment is crisis oriented in most cases, and
11. See J. Anderson, 1970 War Powers Hearings 347.
12. Id. at 348.
13. See J.W. FULBRIGHT, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER 45 (1966). Alexis de Tocque-
ville observed long ago:
War does not always give democratic societies over to military government,
but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of the civil gov-
ernment; it must almost automatically concentrate the direction of all men
and the control of all things in the hands of government. If that does not
lead to despotism by sudden violence, it leads men gently in that direction by
their habits.
II DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 625 (1966).
14. 119 CONG. REC. S 13877 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
15. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives;
but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
1974
Loyola University Law Journal
appropriations are thus sought after hositilities have already begun.
Once the President has committed troops, Congressional alternatives
are reduced and pressure is great to "support our boys in the field."' 6
The President is not obliged to seek specific appropriations from
Congress. He may employ contingency funds or previously appropri-
ated money that was never spent. By the time Congress considers
the situation, the action may be complete. Nor are all appropriations
reviewed by Congress. This is true particularly of secretly conducted
CIA operations which often involve a large commitment of men and
materials.
Senator Fulbright has described American action in Laos:
[T]he CIA undertook to create and did create its own advisors
and directors and army that I think at one point reached about
36,000 men. That fact was carefully kept from the Congress
and from the public. . . We did not find out about Laos until
it had been going on for two or three years; after the damage has
been done, after the commitments, the loss of life, the expendi-
ture of money has taken effect.' 7
Thus, the appropriations process has not been a viable check on
Presidential warmaking.
The Concurrent Resolution
A concurrent resolution is a resolution passed by both houses of
Congress to veto, terminate, approve of, or compel action by the Ex-
ecutive.18 Congress has used the concurrent resolution to express its
support of Presidential actions in Formosa, the Middle East, Cuba and
Vietnam. However, this device has not proven to be an effective check
on the President. First, it expresses only Congressional opinion and
when opposed by the President, it carries little if any practical weight.'"
Secondly, for the concurrent resolution to guarantee any voice at
all in troop deployment decisions, Congress must have access to critical
intelligence information. Recent history, however, demonstrates an ex-
ecutive monopoly of information through prohibitive classifications and
the deliberate misleading of Congress. Misrepresentation of the nature
16. A blatant example of the Presidential fait accompli occurred during Theodore
Roosevelt's administration when a fleet was sent half way across the world and then
funds were requested to bring it home. See RoGERs, WORLD POLICING AND THE
CONS'TrrUTION 83-84 (1945).
17. 119 CONG. REc. S 14192 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
18. See Giannane, The Control of Federal Administration By Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 Hv. L. REv. 569 (1953).
19. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional weight of the concurrent
resolution, see Giannane, The Control of Federal Administration By Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HIv. L. REv. 569 (1953).
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and extent of North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. vessels was instru-
mental in the adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 20  The most
recent example of misleading information was the report of U.S. bomb-
ing raids over Cambodia."'
Another problem with the concurrent resolution is its inexact na-
ture. As Representative Jonathan Bingham put it, "[S]uccessive Pres-
idents have shown themselves quite capable of interpreting Congres-
sional prescriptions to suit their own needs and justify their actions. 22
Consequently, vague wording has been converted into a rubber stamp
for executive action.
23
Public Opinion
Since the President is elected by popular vote, it has been suggested
that public opinion influences executive warmaking. However, a care-
ful analysis of public opinion exposes several frailties in this position.
First, the consensus which removed political incentive from Congres-
20. See Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdic-
tionally Attackable, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 449, 459 (1968).
21. Pentagon officials recently placed the cost of these secret raids at $1.5 billion.
TIME, Aug. 13, 1973, at 7.
22. Hearings on War Power Legislation before the Subcomm. on National Security
Policy and Scientific Development of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1971) [Hereinafter cited as 1971 War Powers Hearings].
23. E.g., The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964):
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam in violation of
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,
have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully
present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to
international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of
aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging
against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense
of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to
protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in
that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work
out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports
the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all neces-
sary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United
States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and Charter of
the United Nations and in accordance with the obligations of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared as
the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall detrmine that
the peace and security of the area is reasonably assurd by international condi-
tions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it
may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
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sional oppositon to Presidential initiatives,24 has led to popular support
of his leadership. This has resulted from several factors including the
complexity of the issues involved, their distance from the everyday ex-
perience of the ordinary citizen, and the powerful influence which
the President exerts in the shaping of opinion on foreign policy.
Secondly, public opinion tends to be supportive in foreign affairs.
Since the President is the representative of the United States to other
countries, most people feel he must be supported regardless of the ac-
tion taken. This is demonstrated by the backing enjoyed by President
Kennedy after the agreed disaster at the Bay of Pigs. 25
Even if the public were capable of forming an independent and ob-
jective opinion on foreign affairs, it still lacks the ability to express
an opinion with sufficient clarity to carry a political punch. Profes-
sor Landecker argues that opinion polls fluctuate too greatly to be
heeded, and the partisan politics during Presidential elections preclude
a meaningful post-election evaluation of what was decided, or even
the response on one issue as distinguished from the others.26
It is doubtful whether many Presidents would heed even a clearly
articulated mandate, especially during a second term. The clearest ex-
ample of this attitude has been revealed by President Nixon who has
declined to expose himself to the press on even the most important
issues since the 1972 elections and who has stated consistently that
public opinion must stand with him in foreign affairs.27
The Watergate hearings have demonstrated a clear disregard for dis-
sent on foreign policy questions and some witnesses have even testified
to attempts to crush such dissent. 28
Judicial Action
Many people have turned to the courts in an effort to check execu-
tive use of armed force which they believed exceeded his constitutional
authority. However, the courts decided early in our history to refrain
from pronouncements on questions more properly handled by the po-
litical branches. This is what has become known as the political ques-
tion doctrine. Unfortunately for the sake of clarity, relations with for-
24. See text accompanying supra note 12.
25. The American Institute of Public Opinion Polls found support for Kennedy's
Presidency was higher after the Bay of Pigs fiasco than during the period two weeks
prior to the event. See T. Lowi, 1971 War Powers Hearings 115.
26. See generally M. LANDECKER, THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLIC OPINION (1968).
27. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 28-30.
28. See Time, June 25, 1973, at 10.
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eign countries was one of the earliest questions categorized as political.
In Foster v. Neilson,2 9 Chief Justice Marshall observed:
The judiciary is not that department of the government to which
the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided;
and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights accord-
ing to those principles which the political departments of the na-
tion have established.30
Although litigants have argued the unconstitutionality of Presiden-
tial action in the absence of a declaration of war, the question, like
that of foreign relations in general, has been considered non-justiciable.
As Judge Wyzanski stated, "[T]he distinction between a declaration
of war and a cooperative action by the legislature and executive with
respect to military activities in foreign countries is the very essence
of what is meant by a political question." 3'
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York has found
the troop deployment issue justiciable but has held that Congress has
given its authorization for intervention in Vietnam. 2 Most recently,
in Holtzman v. Schlesinger,3 3 this court found the President's Cambod-
ian policy "unauthorized and unlawful" and permanently enjoined any
further use of American military force in or over Cambodia. Here,
the power to declare war was held to be a judicially manageable stand-
ard and Congressional appropriations explicitly forbidding military
support of Cambodia were held to discount any pretense of Congres-
sional authorization. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall issued a stay of
the injunction allowing the bombing to continue to the August 15 dead-
line agreed to by the President.3 4
29. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
30. Id. at 307. The specific criteria of a political question were set out in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962):
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, al-
though each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a func-
tion of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held
to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibilty of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
31. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D. Mass. 1968), appeal on
other grounds dismissed, 396 U.S. 1035 (1970).
32. See Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), and Orlando v. Laird,
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
33. 42 U.S.L.W. 1017 (July 31, 1973).
34. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a stay of the district court in-junction until argument on August 13, two days before the August 15 deadline. Never-
1974
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Thus, judicial action has been a fruitless route in attempts to con-
strain the President by reservists, 35 draft resistors,"' citizens,87 and
law professors, 3 as well as troops deployed in such actions.39  These
cases demonstrate the truth of Warren Burger's statement for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court in Luftig v. McNamara40 when he
wrote: "[R]esort to the courts is futile in addition to being wasteful
of judicial time, for which there are urgent legitimate demands. 41
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
The Cambodian incursion of 1970, which resulted in a widespread
reaction against Presidential warmaking power, renewed Congressional
interest in establishing effective checks on this power. 42  Several pro-
posals have been made since then. Early in 1971, Representative
Zablocki proposed H.J. Res. 1 calling for Congressional reaffirmation
of its powers under the Constitution to declare war, without providing
any meaningful process by which to do so.
This legislation recommended that the President seek Congressional
advice, 4  but only required the President to submit a written re-
port describing the circumstances and scope after he had committed
forces or enlarged a commitment. H.J. Res. 1 passed the House by
a voice vote but could not be reconciled with a much tougher Senate
bill, S. 2956.
theless, Justice Douglas, treating the matter as a capital case since it involved the
lives of U.S. airmen, held a summary hearing while vacationing in the State of
Washington and vacated the stay of the Court of Appeals. When Dean Smith, U.S.
Attorney from Spokane, argued that the August 15 deadline was aimed at avoiding
confrontation, Douglas replied, "We live in a world of confrontation. That's what
the whole system is about." Six hours and ten minutes later in an unprecedented
move, Justice Marshall, after consulting other members of the Court, issued a stay of
injunction. See TIME, Aug. 13, 1973, at 7.
35. McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968).
36. Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S
960 (1969); and United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 972 (1967).
37. Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969).
38. Velvel v. Nixon, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S 1042 (1970) For a general discussion of the issues
raised in this suit see Velvel, The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and
Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 U. KAN. L. REv. 449 (1968).
39. See supra note 26; and Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S, (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
40. 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
41. Contra is Justice Douglas' dissent in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886
(1970), in which he examines each of the criteria in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962), and argues that none are present in cases in which soldiers are seeking relief
from orders deploying them to Vietnam.
42. C. Brower, DEP'T STATE BULL., April 9, 1973, at 434.
43. Many members of Congress reject the possibility of informal consultation.
Senator Fulbright recounts such informal consultation which occurred in 1961 when he
overheard the plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion while hitching a ride to Florida in
the President's jet. Once he confronted the President, his opinion was asked, and
then promptly disregarded. He advised against such an action. See J.W. FULBRIIrr,
supra note 13, at 48.
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S. 2956 was passed on April 13, 1972, and with minor revisions
contained the same provisions as S. 731," 4 passed a year earlier and
S. 440, passed on July 20, 1973. Section 3 of the bill delineates four
specific situations in which armed forces may be introduced without
a declaration of war by Congress:
1. To repel an attack on the United States, its territories or pos-
sessions, and to retaliate in such event, or forestall the threat of attack.
2. To repel an attack on U.S. armed forces or forestall such an
attack.
3. To protect evacuating citizens or nationals of the United States
on the high seas or in any country in which they are present by consent
and in imminent threat.
4. To deploy troops pursuant to specific statutory authority not
to be inferred from existing or future laws or treaties unless specifically
granted.
The remainder of the bill requires the President to submit reports
when action pursuant to Section 3 is taken and requires termination
of such action after 30 days unless U.S. forces would be thus endan-
gered or continued action has been authorized by Congress.45 Addi-
tionally, S. 440 provides for the immediate reporting of proposed au-
thorizations to the floor of Congress and requires voting within three
days. 46
The Senate considered many alternative proposals and suggestions
in the form of bills and amendments. Senator Taft proposed an open
termination by concurrent resolution in S.J. Res. 18.11 Senator Ful-
bright has suggested that Congressional authorization be required for
the use of nuclear weapons in a first strike capacity. 48  Senator Domi-
nick has argued for continuing Presidential discretion in intelligence
gathering activities. 49  However, these variations were unable to muster
sufficient support.
The House moved much closer to the Senate view of war powers
legislation by adopting H.J. Res. 542 on July 18, 1973, by a vote of
44. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
45. Sec. 5 also provides for the continuance of action in the event Congress is un-
able to meet as a result of armed attack on the United States.
46. Under Sec. 7, such an authorization is considered reported to the floor when
introduced by one-third of the members. It immediately becomes pending business.
When passed by one house such a bill is considered reported to the floor of the other
house where the same time limits are in force.
47. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
48. Amendment No. 1085 to S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
49. Amendment No. 1113 to S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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244 to 170.50 Section 3 requires the President to report within 72
hours as to the circumstances, authority, scope and cost for any com-
mitment of troops outside the United States or enlargement of forces
already committed. Section 4 provides for automatic termination of
any such action after 120 days unless specific authorization has been
granted by Congress. Unlike S. 440, which requires early termination
by joint resolution necessitating passage by the President, H.J. Res.
542 permits termination at any time by concurrent resolution, and pro-
vides for a priority procedure. 51 Both bills are very careful not to
allow an inference of Congressional authorization from present or fu-
ture laws or treaties.
After five long conference meetings, House and Senate conferees
reached a compromise on October 3, 1973.52 The decline in the pres-
tige of the Presidency occasioned by the Watergate disclosures and
court actions surely gave impetus to the compromise. 53  The Senate
adopted the conference committee report, H. Rept. No. 93-547, on
October 10, 1973, by a vote of 75-20.11 The House passed the bill
October 12, 1973, by a vote of 238-123.15
The avowed purpose of H. Rept. No. 93-547, as stated in Section
2, is
[T]o fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the
United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the
United States Armed Forces in hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities
or in such actions.
The compromise resolution contains much of the original wording
of S. 440 and H.J. Res. 542. The reporting provisions which were
similar in both bills have been retained. However, a report is required
within 48 hours of the introduction of United States forces in a hos-
tility as contained in the House resolution, and no attempt is made
1 50. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For the vote, see 119 CONG. REC. H 6283 (daily
ed. July 18, 1973).
51. The priority procedure of H.J. Res. 542 found in Sec. 5 requires the Foreign
Relations Committee of each house to report a bill for specific authorization not later
than 30 days before the expiration of the 120-day period. This bill immediately be-
comes the pending business and must be voted on within three legislative days. Any
bill passed in one house must be considered by the other not later than 15 days before
the expiration of the 120-day period.
52. See 119 CONG. REC. H 8655 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1973).
53. Chicago Sun Times, Oct. 4, 1973, at 12, col. 8, published the results of a Gallup
poll released the morning of the compromise showing only a 32% approval of Nixon's
handling of the Presidency, which represents a 33% drop since the 1972 elections.
54. See 119 CONG. REc. S 19006 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
55. See 119 CONG. REc. H 8693 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1973).
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to define when the President has authority to intervene as in the Senate
resolution.
An automatic termination after 60 days was finally accepted, al-
though an automatic 30-day extension is provided by Section 5(b)(3)
in the event of an unavoidable military necessity. Early termination
may take place by concurrent resolution as contained in the House
resolution, requiring no Presidential approval.
Priority procedures were adjusted to the 60-day termination period.
Section 7 provides for consideration by the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and their reporting to the respective bodies of Congress within
fifteen calendar days. Any concurrent resolution so reported becomes
the pending business and must be voted on in three calendar days.
Unlike S. 440 and H.J. Res. 542, the compromise resolution pro-
vides for divided time on the floor of the Senate between proponents
and opponents of any concurrent resolution and lays the ground rules
for an expeditious referral to a conference committee in the case of
differences. In addition, Section 8(c) specifically includes the deploy-
ment of advisory forces in the resolution. In Section 8(a), the com-
promise also disallows any inference of Congressional authority from
any present or future law or treaty."6 The compromise was passed over
President Nixon's veto on November 6, 1973 and is now law.
POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Workability of a Time Limit
Many opponents of the war powers legislation seriously question the
workability of a specific time limit, such as 60 days. They suggest
such specificity places Congress in a dilemma. Either it acts with an
incomplete assessment of the situation which precludes a meaningful
56. Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) provide:
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances shall not be inferred-
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of
the enactment of this resolution), including any provision contained in any
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduc-
tion of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and
states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within
the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it
is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning
of this joint resolution.
1974
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choice, or it refuses to act and thereby ends an action which might
have been necessary.17
Senator Javits, author of the Senate bill, has answered such criticism
by analyzing the time limit in terms of balancing two vital considera-
tions,
First, it is an important objective of this bill to bring the Con-
gress, in the exercise of its Constitutional war powers into any
situation involving United States forces in hostilities at an early
enough moment so that Congress' actions can be meaningful and
decisive respecting the carrying on of war. Second, recognizing
the need for emergency action, and the crucial need of Congress
to act with sufficient deliberation and to act on the basis of full
information, a specific time period strikes a balance. ..58
The specific time limit represents a balance which attempts to enable
Congress to act meaningfully, while at the same time, act indepen-
dently. Nor do the specific time limits appear to be an all or nothing
requirement. Congress can extend the time period while it investi-
gates, or if convinced before the termination date that a particular ac-
tion should be ended, it can do so by concurrent resolution.
A specific time limit also poses a problem in terms of actual disen-
gagement from hostilities. First, the procedure is unclear as to when
the period actually begins or at what time disengagement must be com-
pleted.59 Secondly, when Congress does require termination, either
by lapse of the required period or positive action, safe disengagement
may be an impossibility even after the 30-day extension for this pur-
pose in Section 5(b)(3). Thus, a problem similar to that of appro-
priations could develop where Congress would be forced to "support
the boys in the field."'60
Some critics suggest that the 1973 war powers legislation suffers
from the obvious intention of preventing another Vietnam. 6' In that
regard, the specific time limitation may well prevent a steady escalation
over a period of time as in Vietnam. However, it could encourage
57. See Rep. Bingham, 1971 War Powers Hearings 14.
58. See 119 Cong. Rec. S 13870 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
59. Section 5(b) (2) of the compromise resolution provides for an extension of
time by Congress and 5(b)(3) allows an automatic 30-day extension "if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the continued safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued
use of such armed forces."
60. This problem is compounded by the fact that the President as Commander
in Chief has unilateral control of the conduct of hostilities, and seemingly must de-
cide if disengagement is "safe." Nor is it likely that Congress will attempt to inter-
vene in the conduct of hostilities. One need only recall the suffering of American
soldiers at Valley Forge to see the problems in such a course. See T. FROTHINGHAM,
WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF 234 (1930).
61. See generally Schlesinger, supra note 8.
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an aggressive President to go all out to achieve a military victory within
the termination period.6 2 Nevertheless, such a situation could be pre-
vented by a concurrent resolution for early termination, assuming the
President had complied with the reporting provisions and Congress was
aware of his conduct.
Decision-Making
The systematic inclusion of Congress in the overall decision-making
process such as contemplated by the compromise resolution raises cer-
tain issues. In the context of crisis reaction, can Congress deliberate
with the speed and secrecy considered essential for troop deployment
decisions?
Reaction speed is a concept which has not received a great deal
of analysis, with discussion consisting of mere assertion.63  This rhe-
toric has failed particularly in relation to counter-insurgency action,
the framework of modern interventions. In fact, the politics in under-
developed countries such as Vietnam strongly suggest the undesirabil-
ity of any intervention. The decisive factor in political upheaval is
popular support" since support is needed for the victory of either
side,6" and it cannot be achieved by military action.
As Senator Fulbright has written, "America's interests are better
served by supporting nationalism than opposing communism."66 Even
if intervention becomes necessary, the situation does not require the
immediacy which has been demanded by Presidents. This has been
true in disturbances where the protection of American lives and prop-
erty has been the rationale for intervention. 7  It has further been ar-
gued that Congress can act swiftly, and the priority procedures in the
compromise resolution evidence a concern for expediency. 8
Likewise, the need for secrecy has been overstated. First, the Pen-
tagon Papers disclosure proved the Presidency is not an infallible re-
62. See B. Goldwater, 119 CONG. REC. S 13861 (daily ed. July 18, 1973).
63. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, former Under Secretary of Defense, typified the
rhetoric when he stated, "[T]he source of an effective foreign policy is Presidential
power. His is the sole authority to communicate formally with foreign nations, to
negotiate treaties, to command the Armed Forces of the United States. His is a re-
sponsibility born of the need for speed and decisiveness in an emergency." Hearings
before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 151, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71
(1970).
64. This axiom became painfully clear in Vietnam when American casualties be-
came ten times as great as those of guerillas more closely identified with the popula-
tion. See generally H. KISSINGER. PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1965).
65. For the classic presentation of nationalism and its effects, see H. KOHN, THE
IDEA OF NATIONALISM: A STUDY IN ITS ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND (1944).
66. J.W. FULBRIGHT, supra note 12, at 119.
67. See supra note 20.
68. See text accompanying supra note 54.
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pose for classified information. Second, it must also be recognized
that much of the information commonly considered strategic is printed
in the daily papers." 9
Finally, it appears that the United States is moving into a period
of more open conduct of foreign affairs, at least in the near future.
The Nixon administration, rocked by Watergate, seems to be serious
about changing its secretive style as evidenced by the appointment of
its secret negotiator, Henry Kissinger, to Secretary of State.70
Any decision-making process requires the presentation of alterna-
tives. As Morton Halperin observed, "A President must have the in-
formation and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in
order to anticipate problems and make educated choices."'' l Unfortu-
nately, in recent years the executive bureaucracy has been less than
adequate in this respect.72  This has resulted from the elimination of
policy options by high level advisors independently of the President. 3
Thus, Congress can make an important contribution, as James Mac-
Gregor Burns put it, "to pose alternatives, probe relentlessly, publicize
constantly and examine and debate implications. 74  Additionally,
Congress can supply a continuity which the President simply cannot,
due to the turnover of administrative staffs and the removal of Presi-
dential records and correspondence following each administration.75
On balance, the contributions which Congress can make to the over-
all decision-making process seem to outweigh the losses in speed and
secrecy.
Collective Security Agreements (Mutual Defense Treaties)
Doubts have been raised concerning the status of treaties under the
1973 War Powers Legislation. Critics have suggested that limitation
on the President's power with respect to "self-executing treaties" would
destroy our system of collective security. 76  A self-executing treaty
69. See J.W. Fulbright, 119 CONG. REC. S 14199 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
70. Chicago Sun Times, Aug. 26, 1973, at 12, col. 1.
71. See M. Halperin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan., 1972, at 310.
72. See H. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEM 156 (T. Cronin and S.
Greenberg ed. 1969).
73. Another decision-making problem which has recently arisen is the inability of
advisors to confront the President with alternatives that are personally distasteful to
him. As Arthur Schlesinger queried, "Where are Mssrs. Hickel, Romney and Peter-
son? Who in President Nixon's cabinet will talk back to him-assuming they could
get past the palace jannissaries and into the oval office? The fate of those who have
tried to talk back in the past is doubtless instructive." Supra note 8, at 12.
74. 1970 War Powers Hearings 84.
75. See C. COOPER, THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
101 (K. Clark and L. Legere ed. 1969).
76. See B. Goldwater, supra note 60, at S 13861.
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would be one which requires no further action to trigger United States
duties as defined therein.
First, Section 8(b) of the compromise resolution provides:
Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any
further specific statutory authorization to permit members of the
United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members
of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the head-
quarters operations of high-level military commands which were
established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution
and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified
by the United States prior to such date.
This provision specifically allows the coordination of strategy with com-
manders of allied nations.
Secondly, as regards troop deployment, there seems to be no author-
ity for the contention that treaties are self-executing. In fact, the
opposite seems to be the case. The Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee report, recommending the approval of NATO, clearly stated:
The treaty in no way affects the basic division of authority
between the President and the Congress as defined in the Con-
stitution. In no way does it alter the constitutional relationslup
between them. In particular, it does not increase, decrease, or
change the power of the President as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces or impair the full authority of Congress to declare
war.
77
Likewise, when SEATO was organized, Secretary Dulles interpreted
the provisions as requiring affirmative Congressional action to author-
ize military force. 78  Most of the collective security arrangements in
which the United States participates also specify that military forces
must be committed in accord with each nation's constitutional proc-
esses.
7 9
Critics believe that legislative restraint on self-execution will reduce
the credibility of the United States in the protection of its allies. It
has been argued that a lack of credibility would result in a dangerous
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 8 However, the nuclear credibility
of the United States has long ago disintegrated. With the Soviet Union
not only capable of destroying Europe but also the United States, it
77. Senate Executive Report No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1949).
78. Rep. Findley, 1970 War Powers Hearings 56.
79. E.g., Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States
(ANZUS) Art. IV:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes.
80. B. Goldwater, supra note 60, at S 13861.
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is extremely doubtful that the United States would sacrifice its cities
for its allies. 8 1
Thus, with the underlying assumption of collective security nullified,
one must wonder if such agreements need be considered at all. Even
conventional forces and defenses are under sovereign national control
until released by their respective governments,"2 and thus pose no prob-
lem to war powers legislation.
Detente rather than collective armament is the emphasis in interna-
tional relations. This has resulted in a shift in emphasis in interna-
tional goals. As Ernst B. Haas observed: "Economics and economic
blocs are more important than many military and ideological group-
ings. This trend is well under way and rolls on whether willed by
the United States or not. '8 3
The doubts raised by the war powers legislation concerning collective
security agreements seem to carry little practical weight.
Flexibility
With the President responsible for a large range of activities in for-
eign affairs, critics of recent legislation stress the need for flexibility.84
Such comments are particularly directed toward the need to make
shows of force for diplomatic purposes. John Norton Morton believes
the legislation will prevent humanitarian intervention such as in the
Congo as well as U.N. and OAS peacekeeping missions.8 5 In addi-
tion, former Secretary Rogers emphasizes the need to back up our
rights by actions such as those in Berlin, and the flexibility to move
units such as the 6th Fleet in connection with the Middle East situa-
tion.8 6
Proponents of the bills do not foresee such inflexibility. The Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief would still be responsible for the conduct
of military affairs and be able to deploy units and move naval elements
in international waters.8 7  Likewise, peacekeeping operations fall
within the scope of 8(b) which permits such actions.88
81. See OSGOOD, ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 54 (1968).
82. Id. at 50.
83. E. HAAS, TANGLE OF HOPES: AMERICAN COMMITMENTS AND WORLD ORDER
225 (1969).
84. See generally W. Rogers, DEP'T STATE BULL., June 7, 1971, at 721.
85. 1971 War Powers Hearings 103.
86. See supra note 82, at 721.
87. J. Javits, supra note 56, at S 13869. However, it seems such action would be
prohibited under 8(c) if there existed an imminent threat that such forces would be-
come engaged.
88. See text accompanying supra note 74.
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Overview
In evaluating the overall impact of the compromise resolution on
the warmaking process, two transcending factors must be considered.
First, the legislation cannot achieve its purposes unless Congress is able
to obtain objective information. One of the largest impediments to
Congressional participation in the Vietnam decisions was the lack of
independent information.89 To that extent, the effectiveness of this
legislation depends either on Presidential cooperation or aggressive
Congressional investigation.
Secondly, the act incorporates the philosophy that a national com-
mitment of military forces requires the affirmative action of Congress.9"
This philosophy of commitment is a radical departure from the past
and requires either action before the President, or a willingness to over-
ride his decision in full view of the world. Such an orientation would
present a divided front but seems to be the only effective position.9 1
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Specific delineation of a power which has been exercised by both
the executive and legislative branches is fraught with constitutional
problems. The final word on such legislation in relation to the Consti-
tution will ultimately come from the Supreme Court. Already, there
is a great deal of controversy.
Textual Arguments
The sponsors and proponents of the compromise resolution rely on
Art. I, Sec. 8, which gives Congress exclusive power to "declare war,"
"raise and support armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and "make
rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces."92  In addition, they see the President's power in this area
as ministerial and without authority to initiate. 93
89. R. Leggitt, 119 CONG. REC. E 4903 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
90. Such a philosophy is succinctly enunciated in the National Commitments Res-
olution, S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), adopted by the Senate on June 25,
1969.
91. Such divided statements by two branches of government present a specific
problem which John Locke warned must be avoided: "It is almost impracticable to
place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands, or that the
executive and federative power should be placed in persons that might act separately,
whereby the force of the public would be under different commands, which would be
apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin-" II Two TREATIsEs ON CiviL
GOVERNMENT 384 (P. Laslett ed. 1967).
92. Senator Javits has set forth this and other arguments in a brief at 117 CoNG.
REc. S 2527-31 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1971).
93. Id.
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Advocates of unilateral Presidential authority look to several provi-
sions of the Constitution. First, Art. HI, See. 1 states, "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
Many have read the power to commit troops into the "executive
Power." Secondly, Art. II, Sec. 2 provides "The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
Thirdly, Sec. 3 charges the President to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed" which when read broadly, it is suggested, incorpo-
rates the troop deployment power. Finally, it has been argued that
these stated powers in some way add up to an aggregate executive
power allowing the President to make military commitments. 94
Intent of the Framers
Examination of the debates and letters of the Founding Fathers does
not provide any conclusive answer to a modem meaning of these provi-
sions. However, it does tend to establish certain facts. The philos-
ophers from whom the Framers borrowed the concept of a separation
of powers placed the "power to make peace and war" in the hands
of the Executive." Nevertheless, with the drafting of the Articles of
Confederation the power to declare war was placed in the legislature. 6
This decision was based on the colonial British experiences. All
too often the colonies had been drawn into the King's wars, and the
Framers sought to withdraw such discretion from a single man.9 7 It
was the deliberate design of the drafters to give Congress more power
over warmaking than Parliament had possessed."' However, constitu-
tional delegates such as Mason argued for some executive authority
in warmaking to insure that the sword and the purse not be exclusively
in the same hands. 9
Further authority for the inclusion of some Presidential powers is
found in the change of an early draft of the Constitution from "make
war" to "declare war" in Art. I, Sec. 8. However, this change seems
to have been designed to give the President authority to repel sudden
attacks. James Madison's notes on the convention report "Mr. Madi-
son and Mr. Gerry moved to insert 'declare' striking out 'make' war
leaving to the executive the power to repel sudden attacks."' 00
94. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
95. MONTESQUIEU, I SPirr OF THE LAWS 61 (Nugent tr. 1952).
96. M. FARRAND, I RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 65-66 (1911).
97. See W. Chappel, 1970 War Powers Hearings 32.
98. See McKay, The Constitutional Issues--Opposition Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
640 (1970).
99. For the debate centering around the warmaking power, see M. FARRAND, II
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 319 (1911).
100. Id. at 318.
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Although the President was intended to exercise certain warmaking
powers, it is highly unlikely that he was given authority to initiate mili-
tary action. In a letter to Madison in 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote,
"We have already given in example an effectual check to the dog of
war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the executive
to the legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are
to pay.'' 1
1
Even Alexander Hamilton, the leading advocate of a strong Execu-
tive, wrote:
The President is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nom-
inally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in sub-
stance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces as first general and admiral of the confederacy, while that
of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the rais-
ing and regulating of fleets and armies-all which, by the Consti-
tution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. 10 2
Although the warmaking power was intended to be a shared power,
it does not seem to have been intended to be shared in quite the same
manner as history has allocated it. 10 3
Case Law
Unlike the statements of the Framers, language in certain court opin-
ions suggests the existence of unilateral executive power. First, Presi-
dential power to deploy troops has been recognized in at least two
contexts. The President may act in the event of insurrection or direct
attack. The Court was very clear in the Prize Cases,0 4 in which Presi-
dent Lincoln's power to meet the Confederate rebellion without a speci-
fic declaration of war was upheld:
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President
is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does
not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without
waiting for special authority. And whether the hostile party be a
foreign invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the
less a war, although the declaration of it be unilateral. 10 5
Likewise, it seems the President has the authority to protect Ameri-
101. 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
102. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 417-18 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
103. 'See supra note 2.
104. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19 (1827).
105. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863).
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can lives and property abroad. In Durand v. Hollins, °6 the court de-
nied recovery for damages inflicted by a U.S. naval officer protecting
citizens and their property in Nicaragua. Presidential authorization
for the action was upheld, the court stating: "[F]or the protection
of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest
in the discretion of the President."' 10 7
Some decisional authority seems to suggest powers beyond these lim-
ited circumstances. The leading case is United States v. Curtiss Wright
Export Corp.,'018 in which the issue was the constitutionality of Con-
gress' delegation to the President of the power to prohibit the sale of
arms and munitions to countries engaged in the armed conflict in
Chaco. In sweeping language for the majority, Justice Sutherland rec-
ognized that the power in foreign affairs was one of the concomitants
of nationality and not one which needed to be granted in the Consti-
tution. 109 The opinion went on to suggest that the President possesses
inherent powers in foreign affairs:
It is important to bear in mind that we are dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus a very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
Federal government in the field of international relations.1'0
However, Curtiss Wright did not involve the deployment of troops
and was in accord with a delegation of authority rather than contrary.
The importance of Congressional authorization was discussed by Jus-
tice Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,"' where President Truman used the war power as the basis for
seizing the nation's steel mills during the Korean War. He observed:
1. When the President acts in accord with the express or implied
consent of Congress, his authority is at its peak for he then possesses
both his powers and those which Congress can delegate." 12
106. 8 F. Cas. 111 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
107. Id. at 112. A difference of opinion could well develop between the Con-
gress and the President as to whether citizens or their property are in fact in danger.
It is doubtful whether the Court could resolve such a conflict. As the Court said in
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918):
The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative-the political--departments of
the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
108. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
109. Id. at 305.
110. Id. at 319-20.
111. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
112. Id. at 635. In a footnote to this portion of text, Justice Jackson pointed
out that this situation has produced the sweeping language of Presidential power as in
United States v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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2. When he acts without Congressional consent he can act only
upon his independent authority. The validity of such actions will de-
pend on the circumstances of the situation and "contemporary impon-
derables" rather than on legal theory." 3
3. When the President takes measures contrary to the will of Con-
gress, his power is at its lowest, and will be validated by the courts
only by properly disabling Congress from any action on the subject.1 4
Justice Jackson's reasoning, if taken in the converse, would seem
to suggest that the validity of the 1973 War Powers Legislation may
depend on the Court's upholding the disabling of the President from
military commitment in any permanent sense. There are a few old
cases in which dicta supporting such a conclusion is found." 5
These cases involved the capture of enemy privateers in the 1798
naval war with France. In each, the holding seems to center on the
specific power of Congress "to make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water," 1 6 and all were decided before the enunciation of
the political question doctrine." 7 Nevertheless, the Court did find the
President's war power insufficient to permit seizure of steel mills dur-
ing the Korean War"18 and to place prior restraint on the publication
of the Pentagon Papers."19
A telling argument against the constitutional validity of the war pow-
ers legislation has been proposed by William Rehnquist."' He sug-
gests that in areas of concurrent power, the President and the legisla-
ture should be left to find their own compromise based on the needs
at hand, and not a specific delineation of authority. Such delineation
runs contrary to the flexibility intended by the Framers and may ren-
der the Constitution unadaptable to future problems.
Finally, proponents of Presidential power argue from what might
113. It is in the context of this second area, concurrent authority coupled with
Congressional silence, that the great majority of American military actions have taken
place.
114. 343 U.S. at 637.
115. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 1 (1801); and Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
116. See J. Moore, 117 CONG. Rnc. S 6469 (daily ed. May 10, 1971).
117. See T. Emerson, supra note 2, at 62.
118. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
119. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Justice Doug-
las stated in concurring:
The Constitution by Article I Section 8, gives Congress, not the President,
power to declare war. Nowhere are Presidential wars authorized. We
need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress
might have. (403 U.S. at 722).
The majority of the Justices, however, were unwilling to consider this approach to
the case.
120. See Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues-Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U.
L. kEv. 628 (1970).
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be called construction by acquiescence. They contend that Congres-
sional silence during a long line of military actions has established the
power to commit troops in the Executive. There is judicial support
for such a position. In Myers v. United States,' involving the Presi-
dential power to appoint and remove administrative officials, the Court
stated,
This court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a con-
temporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our government and framers of our constitution were
actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long
term of years fixes the construction to be given its provisions. 122
In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 25 the Court allowed the Presi-
dent to continue to exercise his power to withdraw public lands in
view of the continued practice, known by and acquiesced in by Con-
gress. Despite such authority, the fact remains that acquiescence can-
not transfer authority specifically reserved to another branch. Thus,
the fact "that an unconstitutional action has been taken before, surely
does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later
date."'124
CONFRONTATION
War powers legislation inherently contains a confrontation with the
President. Prior to the adoption of S. 440 and H.J. Res. 542, Presi-
dent Nixon made his opposition clear:
As the House begins consideration of H.J. Res. 542, the war
powers bill, I want you to know of my strong opposition to the
measure.
I am unalterably opposed to and must veto any bill containing
the dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions found in sections
4(b) and 4(c) of this bill. 125
The compromise resolution contains even greater restraints than the
earlier House version.
Thus, the Presidential veto was no surprise. It came on October
121. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
122. Id. at 175. The Court recognized other considerations such as "the nature
of the question, attitude of the executive and judicial branches of the government, as
well as the number of instances in the execution of the law in which opportunity for
objection in the courts or elsewhere is afforded." 272 U.S. at 170-71.
123. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
124. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969). Although this case did
not involve a conflict between the executive and legislative branches, it did involve a
separation of powers question with the legislature and judiciary.
125. 119 CONG. REC. H 6243 (daily ed. July 18, 1973). The compromise resolu-
tion contains even greater restrictions than those in HJ. Res. 542. See text follow-
ing supra note 53.
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24, 1973.126 Although the compromise passed the respective cham-
bers by large majorities, it did not appear a two-thirds majority could
be obtained in the House. Nevertheless, the House was able to over-
ride the veto by a vote of 284-135, four over the necessary number,
and the Senate followed suit by a vote of 75-18.111 The vote was
largely a reflection of President Nixon's growing Watergate troubles
and concern about United States involvement in the latest Middle East
hostilities.
The override, however, does not end the confrontation. The Presi-
dent may ignore the legislation in hopes of obtaining judicial invalida-
tion. In such a case, the Congress appears to be without enforcement
power. Impeachment would be ludicrous in a time of real emer-
gency. -12 s  Additionally, statements by at least one of the Nixon ap-
pointees to the Supreme Court suggests little chance of judicial ap-
proval.129
These factors may well suggest that war powers restraints will ulti-
mately have to take the form of a constitutional amendment to ever
be implemented.
CONCLUSION
The long involvement in Indochina has taught the United States
many lessons, among them, the unpredictable nature of military in-
volvements. One need only recall the assurances of Secretary Robert
McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor that the United States would
be out of Vietnam in 1965.130
By the beginning of 1973 when withdrawal of U.S. forces finally
began, the United States had lost more than 46,000 men,13 1 millions
of dollars had been spent, and the economy was burdened by the
resulting inflation and measures taken in an attempt to control it. Nor
does the larger picture reveal the suffering of the wounded which still
continues and the disruption of life by absence and death. The contin-
ued escalation changed the entire scope of U.S. involvement. It is
doubtful that either President Kennedy or Johnson would have inter-
vened had he foreseen the ultimate result.13 2
126. Chicago Sun Times, Oct. 25, 1973, at 6, col. 2.
127. Chicago Today, Nov. 7, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
128. See Rep. Fascell, 1971 War Powers Hearings 7.
129. See supra note 96. Additionally at 628, Mr. Rehnquist stated that "one need
not approach anything like the outer limits of the President's power, as defined byjudicial decision and historical practice in order to conclude that it supports the action
President Nixon took in Cambodia.
130. FACING THE BRINK 207 (E. Weintral and C. Bartlett ed. 1967).
131. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 18, 1972, at 27.
132. See F. ARMBRUSTER, CAN WE WIN IN VIETNAM 168 (1968).
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In any decision, the risks must be weighed against the gains. When
the decision is one to commit troops, the gains are conjectural, but
the risks are impossible to evaluate."' 3 When such an open-ended
step is taken, it seems that both of the political branches should make
the final decision. The 1973 War Powers Legislation evidences a Con-
gressional determination to reassert its rightful place in that process.
However, it appears doubtful that such legislation will survive judicial
scrutiny. Nevertheless, such predictions provide no solution to the
controversy. Concrete conclusions are seldom drawn in political mat-
ters and the recent passage of the legislation over President Nixon's
veto may be significant in another light. As Alexander Bickel pointed
out, "If Congress expresses the determination to function in the future
and especially if it acts now on specific issues, Presidents will under-
stand and Will in the future not fail to resort to Congress. ' 13 4  The
effect which this legislation will have on Presidential attitudes is mere
speculation, but the 1973 War Powers Legislation clearly expresses Con-
gress' determination.
GERALD L. ANGST
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133. See A. YARMOLINSKY, UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER AND FOREIGN POLICY
16 (1967).
134. 1970 War Powers Hearings 45.
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